national interest

in my opinion is overhyped - why is your selfish national interest more important than, for example, those of the Uighur Turks (Eastern Turkestan) or the Tibetans whose autonomous territories were occupied by the Chinese, the first in 47 or 49, the second in 59? - another way of formulating this would be: at what point do more basic humanitarian concerns over-ride the national concern? if at all? - in a way this reminds me of Asimov's Foundation stories... the perennial quest to take everything into account, balance it all out - so yet another way of formulating it, more algorithmically this time, would go like this: given the following: a) solution space too big for exhaustive search b) many variables unknown, to the extent that that neither their number, nature nor inter-relationships are known, perhaps, even perhaps not knowable c) a rich history of previous decisions and recorded consequences and interpretations of such decisions what is the optimal local search strategy? I use the word 'local' to indicate a certain limitation of vision/knowledge. I was going to ask: what is the optimal greedy search strategy? in order to emphasise the limitation also of time and other resources involved in making the decision, but I wasn't sure if 'greedy' was the right word to use in this sense. The criteria for judging optimality would be that no other strategy would have given a better solution given the same knowledge. Again, very difficult to evaluate! (shades of Gödel?!) A subsequent question is: is there just one fixed rule or set of rules? or do you need to figure in a lot of flexibility (in the human domain, things like creativity, patience, tolerance, humour, pragmatism) that cannot be captured/unified at a sufficiently abstract level? ok, I seem to have enlarged the scope way too much and gone on to what is beginning to sound like jurisprudence!! not at all my original intentention, but it shows you my analytical weakness. I wanted simply to point out that actions do have consequences, what goes around, comes around and all that, and that i) what you may think is in the national interest is not actually quite so, either because there are hidden factors at play in the present, or because of the way things will play out later, maybe even one or more generations later ii) it is often way too early to decide what is and isn't in the said interest, hence all claims pro and con need to be considered with caution Finally, what I've been laying the ground for and shying away from stating explicitly: given my personal level of knowledge with respect to a - c above, it seems that an ethical approach based on fairness tempered with mercy is the best. I'm quite sure that this is a good overall strategy at the personal level (i.e., for individuals and also for laws governing individuals), but I wonder how far this applies to affairs of state, especially given the lack of precedent! It appears that a basic study of international law and its applications is called for. That concept is itself so new that there are still arguments over the ICJ, the Nuremberg trials, the Balkan genocide trials. But actually, my question is bigger in that it deals with realpolitik which everyone assures you will never be governable by cissy things like international law. In a sense, my belief would correspond to a national khudi (timely that the song is playing in the background!). Self-respect through mutual respect. Self-accountability at a national level, things like that. Do unto others what you would have them do to you. Yet again, there are other facets: what are the components of the national interest? Does your nation have a coherent raison d'être, all actions being subservient to it? If yes, is it, when considered in depth, really so different from the grandiose goals of a hundred other nations, so different that a compromise based on basic principles cannot be arrived at? A just, honourable, mutually fruitful compromise with longer term benefits. Maybe I'm unconsciously echoing many different people (and plead guilty in advance to piracy if that's what it is), but isn't each quarrel also a meeting? An opportunity to get to know the other better? Is its best utilisation: a) in the worst case, war, in the best, some milder form of conflict (e.g. trade embargo/tarrifs) b) a basic division of the spoils c) a mutual exploitation of the bone in contention, leading to greater cooperation between the two parties I suppose that to many this would seem like starry-eyed optimism, but after two centuries of intermittent war culminating in two glorious world wars, the French and the Germans realised, to use the old cliché, that 1 and 1 make 11, not 2, to the extent even that Schroeder a few years back actually let Chirac represent Germany at an EU meeting. This is without precedent among great powers as far as I know, but is also a measure, though anecdotal, of the amazing mutual confidence of the two countries. Sorry - maybe I'm flogging a dead horse here, but on a personal level, I think this should make sense to anyone who has found that the best way to end a heated dispute is to talk it over calmly after a little while preferably in a neutral place like a club or bar or restaurant or a friend's place. I wonder sometimes if I make any sense at all. And I still can't construct logically flowing arguments on the run.

(May 29, 2004)

the framework

(again, stuff everyone knows, but I feel like writing out even the obvious these days)


The problem for hawks and doves is finding a common language.

Of course, the frustrated (hawkish?) doves would say that it's a problem for them alone since they want dialogue and the hawks don't. Often, I suppose, they are right.

But what if you interpreted aggresive behaviour as a desire to communicate on the part of someone unable or unwilling to do it any other way? That would mean that both sides want to communicate.

So which are the positive elements that each side brings to the negotiating table? The doves bring an overall desire to settle matters through talking about them and one hopes that in talking about things, people arrive at fairer dispensations than otherwise, though, again, this is never a foregone conclusion. I'm unwilling to cite Versailles as an example here as that was a victor's (that is, a hawk's) revenge more than a mutual agreement. I suppose overall one could say that when the doves give in to the hawkishness within (their nature or as personified by some members of their respective delegations), that they fall short of justice.

By giving in to hawkishness I mean when one take advantage of one's superiority (real or perceived) in material terms to gain concessions at the expense of the other party. In other words, when the terms of the negotiation reflect the nature of the power struggle (possibly an armed conflict) that has preceded it rather than starting a new creative process based on a belief in solidarity (hang together or hang separately / fraternité / les copains d'abord) as the fundamental source of empowerment (sorry, I didn't mean to, but somehow I've ended up sounding like a UNESCO/UNHCR/UNFPA brochure! You could replace 'fundamental source of empowerment" with "the only way out for all parties" or "the means of securing salvation for all". To taste.)

It's as if, to lapse into Friedmanese, one could imagine a negotiating table with two sides to it, ostensibly the two parties to a quarrel. But then, within each party, there are two broad divisions - the doves and the hawks. This second division is at a somewhat more abstract plane than the basic, real cause of the disagreement, and the job of those who believe in living together, in an inclusive, respectful manner, is to struggle against those who don't, in their camp and in the other, and build bridges that the hawks on both sides are trying to sabotage.

The most important bridge is language, for communication within one's camp and and across it, generally first with the doves "over there" and then with their help with their own hawks. So that in the end, hawks on both sides can begin to talk and contribute to the discussions in ways other than walkouts, fisticuffs or assorted rude noises.

So what do the hawks bring to the table? A clear idea of their claims, much righteous anger and indignation, which is generally a sign of a straightforward spirit, a certain force of character, just
expressed differently. In this context, I can't help thinking of Muhammad's concerted effort to convert Umar, his most outspoken, dangerous enemy.

Maybe a good way to express the situation would be to say that the two hawks represent the puzzle that the two doves have to solve. They are like recalcitrant and enigmatic oracles (Friedman again?) who define the problem in real but discordant terms and it is the job of
the doves to descend to the real root of their grievances in order to find solutions, many of which may quite naturally not be prejudicial to the interests of the other hawk.

Coming back to language, for me, the two people who really re-appropriated language for me have been Edward Said and Roy. Without their decoding effort, I would be completely lost in trying to gain an understanding that goes deeper than "geopolitics" or "international relations". Which is not to say that they are pioneers, rather they are the authors (along with Chomsky and Eqbal Ahmed) I relate to most, authors who subscribe to a fairly ancient and robust tradition of straight speaking.

displacement?

well, one, because of this song from U2:

"
...

If you should ask then maybe they'd
Tell you what I would say
True colors fly in blue and black
Bruised silken sky and burning flag
Colors crash, collide in blood shot eyes

If I could, you know I would
If I could, I would
Let it go...

This desperation
Dislocation
Separation
Condemnation
Revelation
In temptation
Isolation
Desolation
Let it go

...

"

Then, it's actually true, I am a fish out of water most of the time... a witty friend describes himself as a misanthrope trying to improve to misogynism... me, I'm not even trying, haven't a clue.

Then there's Eureka, in case you forgot middle school physics.

evolution and development
--
stuff you know
--
human foetal development exhibits so many stages from the theory of evolution, only, compressed into 9 months.
subsequently, an individual's development after birth seems to reflect stages in civilisational development.
--
The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were about big ideas, new systems, entirely new ways of organisation. Let's call it the paradigm centuries. The first time that secular organisations and almost pagan individuals conferred such authority on themselves. Terribly liberating, yet tyrannical in that the different visions of utopia (oops... actually the first vision was published in the early seventeenth century I think... right, wikipeadia says 1516, Thomas More) sought exclusive control, demanding, in the same manner as religions such as Islam, that perfection was only possible when all of humanity was within the fold.

You see I'm just a poor software developer. The computing paradigms that found acceptance first were called top-down approaches - where the analysis proceeded in a top-down breaking down of the problem in ever smaller bits that then served as the basis for the construction of the
system that solved the problem. In parallel, but generally restricted to the academia or the defence, developed other approaches to computing, called artificial intelligence or biologically inspired computing. Here too, there is a first stage of top-down analysis whose aim is to produce an approximate system that will be able to learn from instances of a class of problems in order to refine itself optimally. Thus an element of the bottom-up approach to design makes its
appearance.

Thoreau did actually live in nineteenth century - as did Whitman and Emerson. As did the founder of the Sierra Club. The twentieth century saw the big ideas being tried out, competing ferociously. We know the results. But the small world approach was also tried out: the Red Cross, the Sierra Club, the SPCA's, syndicates and unions, women's lib (no offence), non-violence (India and the USA), the very idea of clubs or associations grouped around a common interest or concern, Greenpeace, the Russell Tribunal (aside: Mahmud Ali Kasuri was a tribunal member!), the anti-nuclear power movement, the relatively new International Solidarity Movement, the Grameen Bank, the open source software movement, ATTAC, perhaps the Global Justice Movement, the World Social Forum even, since it is a coming together of people
and ideas and is trying (I desperately hope) to be creative and open rather than following the stupid mistakes of the Internationals, the Narmada Bachao Andolan, the Bolivians fighting Bechtel, the Indian women's rights, reproductive health and anti-caste-based discrimination
NGO's.

It's happening.
Dignité oblige.
It's happening.

A French review called "Manière de Voir" has published a number on "In combat. State of Resistance in the World". The review in the Le Monde Diplomatique says:

Cet ensemble hétérogène d’organisations, associations, ONG et syndicats s’assemble d’abord autour d’un consensus négatif, qui laisse par ailleurs une grande latitude d’action à ses différentes composants. Mais cette configuration génère aussi « une série de tensions, voire
des contradictions, qui handicapent sérieusement son développement et brouillent sa visibilité de l’extérieur » : sur le type de développement à promouvoir, les modes de régulation des échanges économiques, le rôle des Etats-nations, l’articulation entre principes universalistes et droits autochtones. La ligne de fracture principale concerne sûrement l’accès au pouvoir et les alliances avec les partis de gouvernement : entre risques d’éclatement et de récupération, on peut alors se demander si des solutions peuvent être recherchées ailleurs que dans la conquête de fractions plus larges de la population, pour espérer peser sur les décisions politiques.

-- Le Monde Diplomatique, décembre 2005, page 2, Etat des résistances, Une nouvelle livraison de "Manière de voir", Franck Poupeau.


My stab at translating it:
This heterogenous ensemble of organisations, associations, NGO’s and syndicates comes together, first and foremost, around a negative consensus, which leaves, moreover, a great latitude of action to its different composants. But this configuration also generates “a series
of tensions, even contradictions, which seriously handicap its development and fog its visibility from the exterior”*: regarding the kind of development to promote, the modes of regulating economic exchange, the role of the nation-states, the articulation between universalistic principals and indigenous rights. The principal fault line surely concerns the access to power and the alliances with government parties: between the risks of splitting up and recovery, one
wonders if solutions could be explored elsewhere than in wooing larger fractions of the population in an attempt to influence political decisions.

* the quote is taken from the preface of the number under review.

This is a description of a very curious utopia, first brought to my notice by a Polish Jesuit. I had trouble at first believing the speed and depth of inter-cultural interaction in the newly-discovered lands.

Some remarks on violence, democracy and hope (translated from the original in French)

We all cried "no blood for oil", but it has been a long time that oil and blood have run together. Since the betrayal of the Arab world by the French and the British during the fall of the Turkish Empire in 1917 up to the current war, passing by the constant support accorded to Saudi Arabia and to Israel, the Persian Gulf war of 1991 and the embargo imposed on Iraq, western policy has been dominated by oil and has caused much blood to be shed. In 1945, the American State Department qualified the reserves of Saudi Arabia as a "prodigious source of strategic power" and as the "most valuable material in world history" [1]. At least, in those days, the Americans were sincere.

Today, everyone seems to rejoice at the replacement of the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein by what they call democracy in Iraq, as if adversaries and partisans of the war lumped together admitted that the Pentagon had, in the final analysis, done something good. From that point onwards, all armed resistance to the American occupant is to be denounced as being anti-democratic.

I would like to question this unanimity and briefly address three questions that vex the anti-war movement: the question of violence, that of elections and democracy and finally that of hope in the future.

Firstly, in its struggle for emancipation, the Third World has not only produced "Saddams": Ho Chi Minh, Mao Tse Tung and Chou en Lai, Gañdhi and Nehru, Martin Luther King and Malcolm X, Lumumba, Arafat, Ben Bella, Ben Barka, Nasser in Egypt, Mossadegh in Iran, Arbenz in Guatemala , Goulart in Brazil, Juan Bosch in the Dominican Republic, Allende in Chilli, Fidel Castro in Cuba, Amilcar Cabral in Guinea, the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, Sokarno in Indonesia, or Othelo de Carvalho in Portugal, all of thm, whether reformists or revolutionaries, socialists or nationalists, believers or atheists, whether they supported violence or not, have been, themselves or their countries, at one point in time or another, like Saddam Hussein, subverted, demonised, invaded, put in prison or assassinated by the West [2]. Mandela is today treated as a hero, but one should never forget that he had been in prison for 27 years with the complicity of the CIA.

When the Third World tries to free itself through essentially pacific and democratic means, whether it is the Palestinians during the Oslo period, or Allende, or the Sandinistas, or today Chavez of Venezuela, they have had their land stolen and have been subverted in a hundred ways. When they revolt violently, whether it is Castro, the Palestinian kamikazes or the present-day Iraqi resistance, the demonising machine rolls into action and the western humanitarians cry out in indignation.

It would be very nice of the oppressors to let the oppressed know once and for all which arms they consider legitimate for their defence.

It is an old story, that of revolutionary violence which responds to counter-revolutionary violence, but which does not precede it; it is also all of our history, that of the Commune of Paris, of the Russian Revolution, of the Spanish [Civil] War, of the struggle against fascism and of decolonisation.

Coming now to the elections. The ritual invocation of democracy and human rights as justification of imperial domination is today the veritable opium of the intellectuals, an opium that allows them to delude themselves as to the reality of the world. Imagine, for example, that the Ukraine should be occupied by Russian troops and that elections should be held there, without independent observers, without a free press and with the candidates approved by the occupier. Imagine, moreover, that the election is sold to the population by some religious leaders as a means of recovering their sovereignty, while others opposed to the occupation recommend boycotting these elections. I seriously doubt that, in these circumstances, a supposedly high, but un-verifiable [3], level of participation, would be seen in the West as an immense cry of "thanks" addressed to the occupants. What is more, this is the exact expression used by an American journalist [4] regarding the elections in Iraq and it sums up rather well the point of view of those who consider these elections a victory for democracy. Another example: who, among those who celebrate here [in the West], the liberty of the press, will be outraged because the press, concentrated in fewer and fewer hands, was able to convince, on the eve of the presidential elections, 50% of Americans that Iraq was linked to Al Qaida, thesis that is probably one of the best refuted in all of human history [5]? Finally, the CIA has just published a report saying that Iraq did not have any more chemical weapons since 1991 [6]. Which amounts to admitting, mezzo voce, that the genocidal embargo against the Iraqi people was in fact totally illegitimate. One will remember that Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State under the Democrat Clinton, declared that even if it meant the death of 500,000 children, this embargo was worth the trouble [7]. One wonders whether some human rights defence organisation will make a note of these facts.

Coming now, finally, to the question of hope. In 1991, with the fall of the USSR, its uncertain protector, the Third World seemed to be on its knees. One could dream of eliminating the Palestinian resistance through the Oslo accords. The mechanism of indebtedness could be used to organise a gigantic hold-up on their [the Third World's] primary materials and their industries. Nevertheless, hope is in the process of switching sides. The New York Times admitted, after the anti-war protests of February 2003, that there were still, after all, two super-powers in the world: the United States and the global public opinion opposed to its policies [8]. Criticism makes it comeback against the force of weapons and no one can say where this will lead us. In Latin America, the neo-liberal illusions have failed and the neo-colonial system is sinking everywhere. The resistance of the Iraqis has shaken, for two years now, the confidence of the part of the world that believes itself to be civilised. In immobilising, even temporarily, the American army, and in putting in doubt its invincibility, the Iraqis, like the Vietnamese in their time, fight and die for all of humanity.

Finally, let us consider history in the long term: at the start of the 20th century, all of Africa and a part of Asia were in the hands of the European powers. The Russian, Chinese and Ottoman Empires were powerless in the face of western interference. Latin America was invaded even more often then than the present-day. In Shanghai, the English controlled a park that was not accessible "to dogs and to Chinese". If all has not changed, at least colonialism has been overthrown, at the price of millions of deaths, in the dustbin of history (with the exception of Palestine). It is this that constitutes, without doubt, the greatest social progress of humanity in the 20th century. The people who want the re-birth of the colonial system in Iraq, even with what Lord Curzon called, in the epoch of controlled monarchy, an "Arab façade", dream with their eyes wide open. The 21st century will be that of the fight against neo-colonialism, as the 20th has been that of the fight against colonialism.

Insofar as the progress of the majority of humanity is linked to European defeats in colonial conflicts, a narrowly Eurocentric point of view pushes us to see the evolution of the world in terms of decadence, which is one of the profound reasons behind the pessimism that dominates so many western intellectuals. But another vision of things is possible: during the entire colonial period, we, the Europeans, have thought that we could dominate the world through terror and through force. The absurd sentiment of our superiority and our hegemonic will have led us to kill each other, and with us a part of the rest of the world, during the two world wars. All those who prefer peace to power and happiness to glory must thank the colonised people for their civilising mission: in freeing themselves of our yoke, they have rendered, us the Europeans, more modest, less racist and more human. That this continues and that the Americans end up being forced to follow this path.

Jean Bricmont

Jean Bricmont is professor of physics at the University of Louvain-la-Neuve, and also collaborator of the analyst Noam Chomsky, prefacing some of his works.

P.S. Copied here from my chowk page.

Postmodernité à la brésilienne ( translation )

PAR GILBERTO GIL *

Lors d’un de mes derniers séjours en France, je me suis amusé – comme n’importe quel voyageur changeant de continent – à faire l’inventaire, par curiosité, des chaînes de télévision qui m’étaient proposées dans ma chambre d’hôtel. J’ai passé ainsi un moment à naviguer entre une vingtaine de télévisions arabes, qui m’ont frappé par leur diversité musicale : on pouvait voir des programmes de musique traditionnelle très «pure», de la musique folklorique mélangée à ces ingrédients cosmopolites que nous trouvons maintenant partout, de la musique urbaine légère avec chanteuses charmantes et grands orchestres, du rock, du rap, de la musique électronique… Une manifestation de ce qu’on pourrait appeler la «glocalisation» – l’agrégation du global et du local dans le langage musical, les moyens de production, les publics.

C’est, au fond, la même chose en France, la même chose au Brésil, et à peu près partout dans le monde : une musique universelle, tendant vers l’uniformisation, mais avec une présence éloquente de la dimension locale, de la diversité. Cette «glocalisation», c’est l’horizon vers lequel nous marchons.

Mais si vous, Français, et nous, Brésiliens, vivons cette même situation culturelle dans le domaine musical, il se trouve que nous la connaissons depuis plus longtemps que vous. Dès son origine, le Brésil est métissé par sa population ; dès son origine, il est multiculturel et interculturel. Prenez par exemple la musique du Nordeste, avec l’accordéon, le tambour zabumba, le triangle, prenez à Rio de Janeiro les tambourins, dans le chorro la mandoline et la guitare flamenca… La présence, dans les musiques traditionnelles d’un même pays, de ces instruments venus de partout est le résultat d’un long processus qui a commencé avec les explorations des premiers navigateurs européens, et se poursuit aujourd’hui par la diffusion planétaire et instantanée dela musique.

Le Brésil n’avait pas trouvé pleinement sa place dans la modernité. Alors il a dépassé cette question : nous sommes arrivés à la post-modernité avant d’être modernes. Depuis quatre ou

cinq ans, je me pose des questions sur le tropicalisme, dans lequel – avec Caetano Veloso, notamment – j’ai plongé avec passion il y a une quarantaine d’années. En réfléchissant à une
synthèse entre la musique populaire brésilienne, la samba, la bossa nova, le jazz, le rock, la pop music, il s’agissait pour nous d’appréhender la culture comme une entité fragmentée, comme un ensemble pluriel d’éléments pour lesquels nous recherchions un inter-langage. Nous estimions que la puissance culturelle d’un peuple tenait à sa capacité à digérer la réalité globale, mais en même temps à imposer sa singularité. Nous pensions le tropicalisme comme un mouvement moderne mais – cela m’apparaît maintenant – c’était le premier mouvement post-moderne.

Je suis conscient que cela peut sembler paradoxal aux Français, dont la culture est si souvent annonciatrice de mouvements à venir, mais nous avons élaboré avant l’Europe une réponse culturelle à la globalisation. C’est une question de cycle historique : quand les puissances coloniales – la France, la Grande-Bretagne, l’Espagne, le Portugal – étaient forcées à la modernisation par l’explosion économique des Etats-Unis, le Brésil aussi était obligé d’aller de l’avant. Exclu des voies de la modernité par sa situation coloniale, il a expérimenté les prémices de ce que l’on n’appelait pas encore la post-modernité.

Voilà pourquoi le Brésil propose aujourd’hui un modèle neuf de pouvoir. Ce n’est pas un pouvoir fondé sur la dimension militaire, commerciale ou industrielle, mais sur la capacité d’attirer l’autre, la capacité de séduction – un pouvoir culturel. La propagation de la musique brésilienne dans le monde entier, son poids et son influence dans des cultures extrêmement différentes sur les cinq continents (et, par exemple, dans la chanson française), peuvent être vus – en
caricaturant – comme une sorte de colonisation douce et consentie.

La façon dont la France nous accueille à l’occasion de l’Année du Brésil est significative : il nous est clairement signifié que nous avons quelque chose à dire, à montrer, à enseigner. Jadis, les modèles d’influence étaient soit le pouvoir colonial des puissances européennes, soit le pouvoir moderne, pragmatique, économique, des Etats-Unis. Ce qui me plaît dans la situation du Brésil
sur la carte du monde actuel, c’est qu’il montre un modèle différent. Au temps du tropicalisme, nous avions une idée, une ambition, un rêve, que j’ai la chance de voir aujourd’hui s’accomplir : la possibilité que notre culture et notre nation s’imposent au monde non comme une puissance
classique mais comme une force d’intégration et de rapprochement.

* Ministre de la Culture du Brésil.

Postmodernism, Brazilian style

By Gilberto Gil *

During one of my last trips to France, I indulged my curiosity - like any traveller changing continents - by making an inventory of the television channels proposed by my hotel. I spent a while thus surfing through around twenty Arab channels that struck me by their cultural diversity: one could watch very "pure" traditional music programs, folk music mixed with the cosmopolitan ingredients that we now find everywhere, light urban music with charming singers and large orchestras, rock, rap and electronic music… A manifestation of what one could call "glocalisation" - the aggregation of the global and the local in the musical language, the means of production and the audiences.

It is, essentially, the same in France, the same in Brazil, and pretty much everywhere in the world: a universal music, tending towards "uniformisation" [or uniform standardisation], but with an eloquent presence of the local dimension, of diversity. This "glocalisation" is the horizon towards which we are marching.

But if you, French, and we, Brazilians, live in the same cultural situation in the musical domain, it so happens that we have known it much longer than you. Since its origins, Brazil is "métissé" [hybrid-ised, mixed] by its population; since its origins, it is multicultural and intercultural. Let us take, for example, the music of the Northeast, with the accordion, the zabumba tambour, the triangle, let us take the tambourines in Rio de Janeiro, in the choro, the mandolin and the flamenco guitar… The presence, in the traditional music of one single country, of these instruments coming from everywhere is the result if a long process that started with the explorations of the first European navigators, and continues today through the instantaneous, planet-wide diffusion of music.

Brazil did not find its full [rightful?] place in modernism. So, she skipped this question altogether: we reached postmodernism before being modern. For four or five years, I have been asking myself some questions regarding tropicalismo, into which - with notably Caetano
Veloso - I jumped with passion some forty years ago. In reflecting on a synthesis of popular Brazilian music, the samba, the bossa nova, jazz, rock, pop music, we wanted to apprehend culture as a fragmented entity, as a plural ensemble of elements for whom we wanted to find an
inter-language. We believed that the cultural power of a people derives from its capacity to digest the global reality, but at the same time to impose its singularity [i.e., peculiar, individual character]. We considered tropicalismo as a modern movement but - it is clear to me now - it was the first post-modern movement.

I am aware that this would seem paradoxical to the French, whose culture has so often announced the coming movements, but we had elaborated a cultural response to globalisation before Europe. It is a matter of historic cycle: when the colonial powers - France, Great Britain, Spain, Portugal - were forced to modernise by the economic explosion of the United States, Brazil was also obliged to make an effort [or perhaps jump in?]. Excluded from the paths to modernity due to its colonial situation, she experimented with the basics of what one had not yet started calling postmodernism.

That is why Brazil proposes today a new model of power. It is not a power founded on the military, commercial or industrial dimension, but the capacity to attract the other, the capacity of seduction - a cultural power. The propagation of Brazilian music in the entire world, its weight and its influence in extremely different cultures on the five continents (and, for example, in French song) can be seen - if in caricature - as a soft and consenting colonisation.

The way in which France welcomes us on the occasion of the Year of Brazil is significant: it is clear to us that we have something to say, to show, to teach. Earlier, the influential models were either the colonial power of the European powers, or the modern, pragmatic, economic power of the United States. What pleases me about Brazil's situation on the map of the world today is that she presents a different model. In the days of tropicalismo, we had an idea, an ambition, a dream, that I have the good fortune today to see accomplished: the possibility that our culture and our nation should impose itself on the world, not as a traditional power, but as a force for integration and rapprochement.

* Culture Minister of Brazil

[1]accordi(e)on
[2]zabumba tambour (and curiously)
[3]tambourine (same as the dafli, the only musical instrument allowed by many orthodox Islamic interpretations)
[4]triangle
[5]choro
[6]mandoline
[7]flamenco guitare
[8]tropicalismo

Translator's notes: Where I'm not sure about certain translations, I have indicated so within square brackets. The footnotes are entirely my addition to the document as I thought it would be a nice idea to use the web to illustrate Gil's point about the diversity of musical influences in Brazil.